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British governments have long  
regarded the Gulf states as ‘vital 
partners’ in securing the UK’s energy 
security and military interests. Yet the 
strategic importance of the Persian 
Gulf is taking on a new significance, 
with the UK government in the process 
of building a permanent presence in the 
region and establishing a dedicated 
British Defence Staff to oversee it. 
Coordinating this new level of strategic 
engagement is the ‘Gulf Strategy Unit’, 
a group which includes a range of public 
intelligence and security agencies, but 
which operates in secret.
Central to the UK government’s new  
strategy is the establishment of a network of 
facilities and partnerships designed to secure 
a permanent British military presence in the 
Gulf. New and enlarged bases in countries 
such as Dubai, Oman and Bahrain will enable 
the UK to present a more assertive position 
in the region, and to safeguard the all-
important outward flow of gas and oil. At the 
same time, British arms companies continue 
to sell vast amounts of weaponry to support 
the Gulf states’ own military expansion. Since 
2010, the UK government has approved over 
6,000 individual export licences to arms 
companies serving the region, with a 
combined value of £16 billion.
This War on Want report documents the 
findings of an investigation which has 
examined British complicity in state violence 
in the Gulf, and which uncovers a disturbing 
truth at the heart of Britain’s foreign policy. 
There exists today an opaque and loosely 
connected network of British state and 
corporate actors operating in the Gulf region, 
focused on ensuring ‘stabilisation’ and ‘internal 
security’ through the export of materiel and 
training which is used for the purposes of 
internal repression. 
From the training of sniper units to the sale 
of CS gas, and from the delivery of covert 
surveillance technologies to the provision of 
public order training, British officials and 
corporations, working closely together, are 
playing a key role in arming repression 
throughout the Gulf. In this renewed military 
and economic strategy, guaranteeing the UK’s 
continuing access to natural resources takes 
precedence over any publicly stated 
commitment to democracy and human rights.
It is up to the British people to hold the UK 
government and UK corporations 
accountable for their ongoing complicity in 
human rights abuses around the world. All 
readers of this report are encouraged to take 
action to end UK complicity in the repression 
faced by social movements in the Gulf region. 
Please ask your MP to write to the Prime 
Minister with the demands listed at the end 
of this report. Together we can shine a light 
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1 Neo-imperialism in the Gulf
As the Chilcot Inquiry made clear 
when it reported in July 2016, UK 
involvement in the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq was disastrous in 
every way. With hundreds of thousands 
of ordinary Iraqis dead, political and 
economic instability entrenched, and 
Islamic State in control of large swathes 
of the country, the failures of the Blair 
administration have been laid out in 
impressive detail for all to see.
What the Inquiry failed to do, however, was 
place the Iraq War and occupation within  
the context of the broader neo-imperial 
project which has characterised UK strategy 
towards the region since the end of formal 
Empire in the aftermath of the Second  
World War. This project, which has found a 
new urgency among the British foreign policy 
and defence establishment in recent years,  
has seen the UK play a highly interventionist 
role in the region, both in support of the  
USA and independently.
The UK has, for decades, focused on 
combating regional forces which prove 
resistant to British and American interests. 
British intelligence was central to the 1953 
overthrow of the democratically elected 
Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, 
after he began nationalising the Iranian oil 
industry. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 
challenged US and UK dominance in the 
region, as did the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam 
in 1990. Today, a bewildering array of armed 
Islamist groups operate across the region, 
opposed to the presence of Western forces.
Containing or destroying this opposition 
has been a core focus of UK strategy, as 
has guaranteeing the survival of regimes 
considered friendly to British interests. This 
neo-imperial strategy has sought to secure a 
range of interests, circulating around access 
to the region’s crucial markets, bases and 
resources. Most obviously, securing access to, 
and control over, the huge oil deposits in the 
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British oil companies are operating 
throughout the region, and the UK economy 
is hugely reliant on oil imports: around 40% 
of current consumption is imported, a figure 
due to rise to around 75% by 2030.1 In this 
light, the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf 
is considered to be a priority of UK strategy, 
given that significant disruption would pose 
immediate economic disaster.
The UK’s interest in the Gulf is about more 
than oil. Securing access to other markets, 
including defence and construction, also 
drives UK strategy towards the Gulf, as does, 
increasingly, ensuring that the UK is preferred 
as a site for Gulf investment.2 Having a secured 
military presence in the region also enables the 
UK to project its power beyond into Africa, the 
Indian Ocean and Asia. Indeed, imperial strategy 
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries 
saw the main value in the Gulf protectorates 
as providing a springboard to defend the 
Suez Canal, as well as lines of shipping, 
communication and defence through to  
imperial territory in India and South-East Asia. 
This logic remains, with the UK government’s 
2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stating 
that the UK needs to be positioned so as 
to ensure ‘the sea lanes stay open and the 
arteries of global commerce remain free 
flowing’.3 In this, the UK plays a supporting 
role to US hegemony in the Gulf, and one 
which is likely to become more active as 
America ‘pivots’ towards Asia.4
Ensuring 'stability'
In the years since the start of the so-called 
‘Arab Spring’ in 2010, attempts by civil society 
groups across the Gulf region to challenge 
longstanding authoritarian rule have been  
met with brutal force by the state.  
Pro-democracy protests have been targeted 
with indiscriminating force, human rights 
groups have been subjected to widespread 
state surveillance, and the torture and 
extrajudicial execution of dissidents has 
become even more prevalent than before.5 
Ruling regimes across the Gulf region have 
used the excuse of ‘internal security’ and 
the threat from ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ 
to justify their violent crackdown on a wide 
range of political movements.
The UK government, and British arms and 
security companies, are deeply implicated in 
the continuing state violence across the Gulf, 
despite an official narrative which stresses 
support for democracy and human rights. 
This involvement is no mistake: support for 
the region’s governments in their fight against 
‘internal instability’ has been a central plank of 
British foreign policy in the Gulf for decades. 
During the years of formal British empire in the 
Gulf (up until 1971), and during the subsequent 
postcolonial phase, the UK has played a key 
role in stabilising governments considered 
friendly to British interests. This continues 
today, and has accelerated in recent years as 
Whitehall has identified ‘stabilisation’ as central 
to its Gulf strategy in the near future.
British and American dominance in the Gulf 
is ensured through both a direct military 
presence across the region, and through 
bolstering the capacity of client states to 
ensure domestic stability. British strategy has 
centred on arming and training police and 
security forces across the region in order  
to maintain internal security. This strategy  
is not just government-led: there is an  
increasing involvement of private security 
companies and defence contractors working 
hand-in-glove with the British foreign policy 
and defence establishment as the privatisation 
of war continues to pick up pace.6
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2 New strategic presence
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Today, we are witnessing a rapid 
upswing in British military and strategic 
commitment to the Persian Gulf, 
intended primarily to secure  
the uninterrupted flow of oil from  
the region, as well as access to markets 
and resources. Rather than the large-
scale but temporary influx of troops 
between 2002 and 2009, this new 
strategy foresees a permanent but 
‘shadow’ presence policing shipping 
lanes, providing security assistance, and 
enabling a larger force to be introduced 
in the future if circumstances warrant. 
Vital partners
The UK sees the Gulf States as ‘vital partners’, 
not least in the realm of energy security.  As 
such, the government is in the process of 
building ‘a permanent and more substantial UK 
military presence’ in the region, and establishing 
a new British Defence Staff dedicated to the 
Gulf.7 Coordinating this new level of strategic 
engagement is the ‘Gulf Strategy Unit’: a highly 
secretive group which includes a range of 
intelligence and security agencies.8 Despite 
its high-level position within the British 
government, very little public information exists 
regarding the Unit. Freedom of Information 
(FOI) requests for simple information such as 
the number of times the Unit has met, or the 
work that it is involved in, have been rejected.9
Central to this commitment is the 
establishment of a new network of regional 
facilities and partnerships, designed explicitly 
to establish a permanent British military 
presence throughout the region. In October 
2012, the Government agreed the UK-Bahrain 
Defence Cooperation Accord, which 
according to the Foreign Secretary ‘provides 
Former Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond and Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheik Khalid bin 


































a framework for current and future defence 
activity with Bahrain, including training and 
capacity building, partly in order to enhance 
the stability of the whole region.’10
This was closely followed by ‘a defence 
industrial partnership’ with the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), signed following a visit by 
Prime Minister David Cameron, for the 
‘security of the UAE and the wider Gulf 
region’.11 In 2016, visits to the region by 
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon landed 
similar agreements with Oman and Qatar.12
New bases
As well as training and joint exercises, these 
new partnerships are designed to facilitate 
base construction and expansion. For instance, 
according to David Cameron, ‘what you 
are seeing specifically with the United Arab 
Emirates is not just a plan to sell Typhoon 
aircraft, but a big, significant defence co-
operation, which could lead to more British 
troops stationed in their country.’13  These 
would likely be positioned at the al-Minhad air 
base in Dubai, which already holds a squadron 
of RAF Typhoons and was a logistical hub for 
the war in Afghanistan.14 One defence source 
has been quoted as saying that ‘you could see 
an infantry battalion based in al-Minhad, being 
able to train alongside the Emirates’ as one of 
several new bases in the region.15
Perhaps the boldest move so far has been 
the ‘landmark’ agreement between the UK 
and Bahrain in December 2014, when it 
was announced that the UK would build 
a permanent naval base in the country. 
Construction for HMS Juffair – named 
after a colonial base in the country from 
the 1930s – began in November 2015, with 
costs of £15 million being met largely by 
the Bahraini government.16 According to the 
Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, this base 
constituted a ‘watershed moment’, and was 
designed to guarantee ‘Britain’s sustained 
presence east of Suez’ and ‘enable Britain to 
work with our allies to reinforce stability in 
the Gulf and beyond.’17 Likewise, Oman is 
seen as a crucial future location for military 
facilities to which the UK will have access. 
Corporate interests play a central role in 
this new strategic presence. In March 2016, 
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced 
a multi-million pound joint venture between 
British defence company Babcock International 
and the Oman Drydock Company. As well 
as providing work for the UK company, this 
will deliver a newly expanded port at Duqm, 
providing ‘a strategic port for the Middle East 
on the Indian Ocean, benefiting the Royal 
Navy and others.’ This ‘permanent presence’ 
by the British will, according to the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD), ‘enable the UK to shape the 
development of the naval facility to support 
future carrier capability and wider British 
maritime needs in the area.’18
This new network of facilities will enable the 
UK to present a much more assertive position 
in the region. The UK’s Chief of Defence 
Staff, General Sir David Richards, has spoken 
about new capabilities for British forces 
aiming to ‘project power with global effect 
and influence’, with a primary target for this 
projection clear: ‘Nowhere is more important 
to us’, said Richards in a speech to the Royal 
United Services Institute, ‘than our friends in 
the Middle East and Gulf.’19
This plan is coming to fruition. For example, 
from April 2016, the UK has led the Combined 
Task Force (CTF150), whose operational area 
covers the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean 
and Gulf of Oman. According to Fallon, this role 
is predicated on ‘the permanent presence of the 
Royal Navy in the Middle East’, which ‘helps to 
keep maritime trade flowing and safeguards 
the UK economy by countering piracy and 
policing the flow of oil and gas into our ports.’20
Training and assistance3
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Despite a new direct military presence 
building up in the Gulf, a central plank 
of UK strategy remains one of building 
the local capacity to ensure stability 
and internal security. Gulf militaries 
remain the primary market for UK 
arms, with Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, respectively, the first 
and second largest global recipients 
of British defence exports. More than 
6,000 individual licences have been 
granted to companies exporting to the 
Gulf since 2010, with a combined value 
of over £16 billion (representing 30% of 
the total licences approved). In addition, 
hundreds of open licences to the region 
have been approved, providing UK arms 
companies with the ability to make 
multiple sales without further scrutiny.21
Military training
As well as supplying arms and other security 
materiel, the UK continues to play a key role 
in providing police and military training to 
regimes in the Persian Gulf. Such training is 
formally subject to the umbrella ‘Overseas 
Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA)  
Human Rights Guidance’, designed to ‘ensure 
that our security and justice work reflects 
our commitments to strengthen and uphold 
the record of the United Kingdom as  
a defender and promoter of human rights  
and democracy.’23
However, concerns regarding human rights 
appear to have had minimal impact on the 
training and assistance programmes in the 
Gulf. For example, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
are among 16 states designated by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)  
as having significant human rights concerns, 
and yet both receive military training from 
the MoD.24 
Much of this training takes place in the 
United Kingdom. There is a close relationship 
between the region’s armed forces and 
the RAF College at Cranwell, which trains 
officers from the Gulf each year.25 Likewise, 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total value
Military £376m £1.9bn £608m £1.8bn £243m £3.3bn £598m £9.2bn
Dual use £340m £1.6bn £1.2bn £2.5bn £846m £233m £34m £6.8bn
Total value £1.1bn £3.5bn £1.8bn £4.3bn £1.1bn £3.5bn £632m £16bn
Open licences 113 159 118 115 110 152 27 784






























officers from all Gulf states train at the Royal 
Military Academy at Sandhurst, which itself 
has been financed heavily through regular 
large donations from the King of Bahrain.26 
The Kingdom itself sent over 100 officers 
for training at Sandhurst and other military 
colleges between 2006 and 2011,27 and 43 
cadets to Sandhurst since the uprisings in 
2011, for which the Academy received an 
income of £1,514,000.28
Other forms of training take place in the 
region itself. In Oman, for example, the UK is 
now ‘working more closely than ever across 
military, counter-terrorism and intelligence 
fields to tackle shared threats to stability.’ At 
least 45 short-term training teams are being 
deployed to Oman during 2016, and the UK 
is also looking at constructing a permanent 
training facility in the country.29
Likewise, the College of Policing, the 
professional body for police in England and 
Wales, is heavily involved in training the 
region’s security forces.30 Responses to FOI 
requests document that over 300 college staff 
and ‘associates’ engaged to deliver training 
have been deployed to UAE, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain since 2012. Meanwhile, 
over 50 officers from the region have visited 
the UK for training purposes.31 Despite 
the fact that such training is meant to be 
formally assessed for the impact on human 
rights, via the Department for International 
Development’s Stabilisation Unit and 
the FCO’s Overseas Security and Justice 
Assistance guidance,32 new figures show that 
fewer than 25 assessments have been made 
by the International Police Assistance Board 
(IPAB), which granted its approval in all but 
one of these.33
Private training
Training is often delivered by private 
military and security companies or defence 
contractors working in the region. For 
example, much of the UK training of Saudi 
forces is delivered through BAE Systems, 
as the Prime Contractor in the MoD Saudi 
Armed Forces Project (MODSAP) contracts. 
The company has been in Saudi Arabia 
since 1973, and currently employs nearly 
4,700 people across at least seven sites.34 
Key clients of these projects include the 
three main branches of the military (Royal 
Saudi Air Force, Royal Saudi Navy, Royal 
Saudi Land Forces), but also the Ministry 
of Interior and the National Guard.35 Total 
personnel employed by MODSAP since 
2010 average at around 200, with over half 
of these classed as ‘civilian’ and the majority 
of the rest drawn from the RAF.36 Training is 
a key aspect of these projects, and in January 
2015 the company launched BAE Systems 
Saudi Development and Training (SDT) as a 
separate asset, to coordinate and grow this 
arm of the business.37
Other UK defence contractors are active in 
the region, providing security alongside local 
forces and engaged in training and assistance 
programmes aligned to broader UK objectives. 
This is perhaps unsurprising, given the revolving 
door between the UK military and private 
defence and security sectors. For example, 
Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb, former director of 
Special Forces and commander of Field Army, 
is a Non-Executive Director of Aegis Defence, 
which has an office in Bahrain.38 Lamb is also 
a special advisor to G3 (Good Governance 
Group), a PR company which received £1.5 
million from Bahrain to coordinate a ‘media 
campaign to support the Kingdom of Bahrain’s 
stance before the international community.’ 
Lamb has taken this to heart, questioning a 
focus on Bahrain as ‘a harsh spotlight ‘ for a  ‘a 
country that enjoys the 10th freest economy 
in the world and was the first Arab country to 
institute unemployment benefit’ in a Guardian 
comment piece in 2012.’39
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Likewise, G4S runs operations throughout 
the Gulf region. In Saudi Arabia, G4S has 
a joint venture, Almajal G4S. The company 
provides ‘manned security services’ and in 
November 2012, The Guardian reported that 
‘the company’s support for the regime during 
popular protests earned local staff a two-
month bonus.’40
Olive Group provides offshore security in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa 
from an operational headquarters in the 
United Arab Emirates. This involves deploying 
‘specialist maritime teams comprised of a 
number of highly skilled individuals with 
diverse field expertise acquired from military 
and maritime service throughout the 
region’.41 Likewise, Control Risks provides 
‘strategic consultancy, expert analysis and 
in-depth investigations, handling sensitive 
political issues and providing practical on-the-
ground protection and support.’ A previous 
investigation by War on War revealed that 
many of the key management positions within 
the organisation are held by ex-members 
of UK and US military and intelligence 
services.42 Control Risks has offices in Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai and Saudi Arabia.
Quashing unrest
Many of the training and assistance 
programmes provided by UK state and 
corporate actors are directly focused on 



































ulf internal security. For example, Bahrain’s police 
force has hired former Metropolitan Police 
assistant commissioner John Yates. Yates has 
focused on building local capacity to manage 
public disorder, including through the use 
of kettling and other ‘containments’ tactics. 
According to Yates, the protests in 2011 
which led to the deaths of protesters were 
simply ‘vandalism, rioting on the streets, acts 
of wanton damage that are destroying the 
economy’, and the Bahraini authorities were 
facing ‘extraordinary provocation’ during the 
pro-democracy protests.43
Training provided by the College of Policing 
dovetails nicely with Yates’s strategy, with 
hundreds of staff deployed to the region to 
build capacity in, among other areas, crowd 
control and surveillance. Details released to 
us from the College show that the regimes 
receive training in dealing with public disorder, 
as well as a range of covert investigation 
techniques, open source intelligence  
gathering and managing ‘communications  
data’ investigations.44
In March 2016 it was revealed that elite Royal 
Navy commandos had travelled to Bahrain to 
provide week-long training courses in the use 
of sniper rifles, despite the fact that snipers 
were used to put down pro-democracy 
protests in 2011.  Working from a naval 
frigate docked at HMS Juffair, the specialist 
commandos trained ‘multiple groups’ of 
Bahraini snipers, and have already been asked 
to run a follow-up course for further units.45
10
John Timoney, former U.S. Miami Police Chief and John Yates, former assistant commissioner 











In terms of monetary value, the most 
significant UK arms deals to the Gulf 
in recent years have been for ‘big ticket 
items’. More than £6 billion worth of 
licences since 2010 have included the 
sale of military aircraft and warships, 
with the largest a series of multi-billion 
pound sales of combat aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia.46 However, equally important 
for UK strategy has been the systematic 
export of a series of ‘repressive 
technologies’, designed to assist regimes 
with ensuring internal security.47
Most important amongst these have been 
technologies designed for riot control. 
Tear gas has been used systematically by 
the Gulf authorities to suppress dissent, to 
an extent rarely witnessed elsewhere. An 
investigation by Physicians for Human Rights 
found that the extensive and persistent use 
of tear gas in Bahrain was ‘unprecedented 
in the 100-year history of tear gas use 
against civilians throughout the world.’48 
Authorities used it extensively to disperse 
protests, firing canisters at very close range 
to cause maximum damage. Bahrain Watch 
has recorded ‘over 39 deaths from excessive 
use of teargas and part of these deaths are 
direct body shots on the head and neck.’49 
State forces also used it to attack Shi’a 
civilians inside their homes and cars, throwing 
canisters through the windows, doors and air 
conditioning vents of family homes.50
Similarly, regimes have used snipers, 
birdshot and a range of other small arms 
ammunition to target organisers of protests, 
and the protests themselves.51 Surveillance 
of dissident groups is widespread, with 
opposition politicians, human rights 
workers and trade unionists all subjected 
to eavesdropping and monitoring. For 
example, Freedom House has concluded 
that ‘surveillance is rampant in Saudi Arabia; 
anyone who uses communication technology 
is subject to government monitoring, which 
is officially justified under the pretence of 
protecting national security and maintaining 
social order.’ 52
The UK government plays a key role in 
supporting and promoting British companies 
that wish to meet the public order and 
surveillance needs of the Gulf regimes. This 
task is coordinated by the Defence and 
Security Organisation (DSO), which has 
identified Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE as ‘priority markets’ for the 
export of UK arms.53
DSO works closely with the ADS Group – an 
industry lobbyist for the UK’s defence and 
security sectors – to organise and fund arms 
trade fairs and security exhibitions across 
the region. In 2016, this includes Milipol in 
Doha, Qatar and INTERSEC in Dubai, UAE.54 
Likewise, in October 2015, the Emirates 
Security Exhibition and Conference in Dubai 
(EmSEC) – ‘a premier platform to showcase 
technologies and solutions for law enforcement 
and security markets’55 – saw DSO host 
a reception for all participating UK firms 
and consultants.56 According to information 
released to Reprieve under FOI, the UK 
Government spent £12,000 on encouraging 
British companies to attend this event.57
While internal security is not the only 
aspect of these fairs, it is certainly central. 
EmSEC was sponsored by the Dubai police 
force, which has repeatedly been accused 
of torture.58 The sponsors distributed a 
‘requirements list’ to participants beforehand, 
listing ‘audio recording’, ‘communication 
monitoring’, ‘covert security and surveillance’, 
‘public order equipment - electronic’ and 
‘surveillance’ as the products and services 
required by the Dubai Police Force.59 
Likewise, a recent IDEX exhibition – ‘the 
only international defence exhibition and 




























An exhibit at Milipol Qatar 2014 arms fair
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Africa region demonstrating the latest 
defence technology across land, sea and 
air’– saw nearly 100 companies attend with 
products for ‘internal security and 80 UK 
companies from the UK defence and  
security industry. 60
It is not possible to delink the export of 
sniper rifles and tear gas, and the training of 
security forces by the UK, from the violent 
crackdown on pro-democracy protests 
across the region.61 The UK Armed Forces 
Minister has admitted that ‘it is possible that 
some members of the Saudi Arabian National 
Guard who were deployed in Bahrain may 
have undertaken some training provided by 
the UK military mission.’62 There is evidence 
that birdshot sold by three UK companies – 
Gamebore, Eley Hawk Ltd and Hull Cartridge 
– was used to suppress Bahraini protesters, 
with cartridges bearing company logos found 
at protest sites.63
The UK Government plays 
a key role in supporting and 
promoting British companies 
who wish to meet the public 
order and surveillance needs 











Our research identifies that nearly 500 
British companies applied for export 
licences to the Gulf between 2011 and 
2015. This included licences for the sale 
of paramilitary police goods (coded 
PL5001 in the Export Control List). 
More than 120 licences, valued in total 
at £45.6 million, were approved by the 
UK, which included the sale of items 
specifically designed for aggressive 
crowd control, such as tear gas agents 
and ammunition, CS grenades, water 
cannon and acoustic devices designed 
to cause severe discomfort and thereby 
disperse crowds.64 In addition, 20 open 
licences were approved for the transfer 
of these goods on an ongoing basis 
(such as one to Oman containing ‘crowd 
control ammunition, CS hand grenades 
and tear gas agents’).
Riot control
Although the way in which arms export 
data are released by the UK Government 
often makes it difficult to identify the value 
of the export of specific technologies, our 
investigation has revealed the value of riot 
control goods in more than 40 of the largest 
individual licences to the region. Some of the 
largest sales include:
• £16.5 million worth of goods to Oman  
for ‘tear gas/irritant ammunition’ in  
August 2015;
• £6.1 million to UAE for ‘crowd control 
ammunition and tear gas/irritant 
ammunition’ in March 2014;
• £1.7 million to Saudi Arabia for ‘crowd 
control ammunition, tear gas/irritant 
ammunition and training crowd control 
ammunition’ in December 2012; 
• £1.7 million to Oman for ‘acoustic devices 
for riot control’ in two licences dated 
March and June 2012.
There is a wide range of UK companies 
involved in the sale of riot control 
technologies and ‘public order’ training, 
often working alongside British government 
security officials. For example, in both 2013 
and 2015 BAE Systems Global Combat 
Systems Ltd requested licences to sell 
electrified riot control vehicles to Saudi 
Arabia. This came despite the fact that BAE-
manufactured trucks had been used by the 
Saudi security forces to protect state key 
installations and infrastructure. This allowed 
the Bahraini forces to concentrate on dealing 
with the February 2011 protests. British 
manufactured BAE Tactica armoured vehicles 
were also used to transport Saudi troops, 
and an export licence for Tactica components 
was issued in June 2011, while Saudi forces 
remained in Bahrain.65
Likewise, Civil Defence Supply is a 
Lincolnshire-based company casting itself 
as ‘pioneers in the development of less 
lethal technologies’, and providing a range 
of public order training and products.66 The 
company’s website describes the provision 
of public order training to the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard as part of the British Military 
Mission, and makes clear that ‘experienced 
senior instructors from the British military, 
police and special forces compliment [sic] 
the company, enabling Civil Defence Supply 
to deliver cost-effective and achievable 
solutions.’67 Since 2011, the company has 
applied for 11 export licences to supply anti-
riot equipment to UAE.
Drum Cussac is a Bournemouth-based 
‘travel risk management specialist’ with a 
team of practitioners bringing ‘hands-on 
experience from the military, intelligence 
services and police’.68  The company has 
exported technologies marketed as ‘Long 
Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs)’ used for 





























in the UK’s Export Control List as ‘acoustic 
devices for riot control’. In 2012, the 
company applied for two export licences 
to sell acoustic devices to Oman, with a 
third in 2013. Licensing data show that three 
different licences were granted in 2012 to sell 
these to Oman for riot control (total value 
£1,925,000), and on 25 June 2014 a fourth 
licence was approved for the sale of £750,000 
of acoustic devices for riot control to Oman.
Chemring Group, headquartered in 
Hampshire, provides aerospace, defence and 
security markets with a range of specialist 
technology services and products.70 The 
company made significant profits during the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,71 but as the 
defence budgets of NATO countries have 
been cut, the Middle East has been identified 
as a ‘target growth market’.72 In 2015, the 
company won a record contract worth 
in excess of £100 million to supply 40mm 
grenades to an unnamed country in the Middle 
East.73 Between 2011 and 2015, Chemring 
requested 78 export licences to sell weapons, 
ammunition and equipment to Gulf states.
The sale of tear gas, through its operating 
company Chemring Defence, has been 
particularly controversial in recent years. In 
December 2011, it was revealed that Chemring 
manufactured tear gas was being used to 
supress pro-democracy protesters in Egypt’s 















Spent tear gas canisters, stun grenades and rubber bullets piled up in Pearl Square, a day after 
Bahraini police clashed with demonstrators trying to occupy Manama's banking centre
15
protesters in Hong Kong were also subjected to 
Chemring manufactured tear gas.75 The British 
government had granted six export licences for 
the crowd control weapon since 2010, in sales 
worth £180,000. In 2012, Chemring applied 
for three export licences to sell ammunition 
and equipment that includes smoke canisters 
to Saudi Arabia. Data show that in 2012 one 
licence was granted for the sale of CS hand 
grenades to Saudi Arabia, worth £469,215.
In 2012 it was reported that security forces in 
Kuwait used plastic bullets, smoke bombs, tear 
gas and shot guns to put down a demonstration 
by stateless protesters.76 Some of the 
discharged plastic bullets were manufactured by 
the UK-based company Haley and Weller. 
In 2001 Haley and Weller became part of PW 
Defence, a group now part of Chemring.77
Deenside is a Northampton-based 
manufacturer, providing ‘civil and military 
protective equipment used by police, prisons 
and military throughout the world’.78 Its 
products include riot gear, batons and public 
order tactical vehicles armed with water 
cannons. The company applied for two  
licences to Bahrain in 2011 and 2012.
Sniper rifles
In addition to the sale of riot control 
technologies, our investigation has uncovered 
hundreds of licences for assault rifles, sniper 
rifles and other guns some of which have been 
used to suppress protests and assassinate 
government critics. No fewer than 99 separate 
licences to the region were approved between 
2010 and 2015, which included the export of 
sniper rifles and their components.79 Of the 13 
export licences destined for Bahrain, only one 
was revoked after the events of February 2011. 
In all, our analysis shows hundreds of units 
were sold by UK companies across the region, 
ensuring that the sniper training by Royal 
Commandos had enough well equipped clients.
More than 20 of these licences were applied 
for by Accuracy International Limited, 
a Portsmouth-based company which prides 
itself as ‘one of the foremost suppliers of 
high-accuracy, robust and reliable sniper rifles 
in the world, with customers in more than 
60 countries that include many of the most 
prestigious and influential military and law 
enforcement agencies.’80
Primetake Ltd, based in the West Midlands, 
is a ‘manufacturer of specialist ammunition 
and public order solutions.’ The company 
makes ammunition for Omega sniper rifles, 
cartridges designed to breach doors and 
walls,81 and irritant ammunition which ‘can be 
fired at ranges of up to 35m through doors 
and windows (including most types of glass) 
and produces an immediate large cloud of 
fast-acting CS dust…’82 The company also 
specialises in ‘products designed to be used 
in riot control operations or where less than 
lethal force is necessary,’ including baton 
rounds, crowd control ammunition, CS gas 
and a range of training courses.83
Between 2011 and 2015, Primetake requested 
30 export licences to sell its equipment to 
the Gulf, including 2012 licence applications 
for the export of ammunition to Saudi Arabia 
and UAE. Data show that two export licences 
were approved for the sale of crowd control 
ammunition to Saudi Arabia, worth £2.15 
million in total, with a third on 22 March 2012 
for the sale of £23,153 worth of tear gas/
irritant ammunition to UAE. Reports have 
suggested that Primetake ammunition was 
used by Saudi forces in the assassination of a 
Shi’a dissident, Abdul-Rahim al-Faraj.84
Surveillance
Gamma Group is a UK company which 
provides ‘advanced technical surveillance, 
monitoring solutions and advanced 





























exhibiting at Milipol arms fair in Qatar in 
October-November 2016.86 Gamma Group 
developed a system called FinFisher IT 
Intrusion, which allows users to spy on  
Skype conversations, monitor emails 
and access ‘live’ surveillance through the 
microphone and webcam.87
There is evidence that the surveillance 
software distributed by Gamma Group has 
been used to spy on Bahraini pro-democracy 
protesters.88 In August 2014, leaked internal 
documents from FinFisher showed that 
spyware had been installed on 77 computers, 
including those of human rights lawyers and 
opposition leaders.89 It had previously been 
revealed that that the UK-based company 
offered to sell its spying software to the 
Egyptian security services prior to the 
popular uprising.90
QinetiQ is a UK company and formerly 
part of the MoD. One of its areas of 
expertise is cyber security, providing 
‘comprehensive 24 x 7 monitoring and 
alerting’.91 The company recently opened 
an office in Abu Dhabi to provide ‘technical 
advice and support to a broad cross-section 
of defence and security clients – primarily 
within UAE, but also in neighbouring Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
including Oman’.92 












This report exposes the strategic 
ambitions of British imperialism in 
the Persian Gulf. The expansion of the 
UK’s military, strategic and corporate 
commitment is clearly intended both to 
secure the uninterrupted flow of oil from 
the region, and to protect access to other 
key markets and resources. Central to 
this greater commitment – coordinated 
by a secretive ‘Gulf Strategy Unit’ – are 
new partnerships designed to facilitate a 
permanent British military presence.
 
Joint investment in building new military bases 
is a core element of the strategy. A prominent 
example is a multi-million pound joint UK and 
Oman venture to build a port at Duqm. The 
project is designed to guarantee the UK a 
strategically important military base long term 
in the Gulf.
 
Ensuring stability and internal security is also 
vital, which is why the UK is putting such effort 
into building the military and police capacity of 
the Gulf States, despite significant human rights 
concerns. Providing training and equipment also 
helps corporate interests directly: this report 
details training delivered by private military 
and security companies (PMSCs) or defence 
contractors working in the region. Companies 
familiar from War on Want’s previous 
Mercenaries Unleashed report are running 
training operations throughout the Gulf, often 
directly focused on internal security. Once 
again, the revolving door between UK police or 
military forces and PMSCs is clearly evident.
 
The report also details the increase in exports 
from UK companies designed for riot control 
and suppressing dissent such as tear gas, 
sniper rifles, birdshot and covert surveillance 
equipment. Exports of such repressive 
technologies to the Gulf regimes are designed 
to assist with ensuring internal security, and 
are promoted through UK government 
agencies. These exports are linked in turn with 
the violent crackdowns on pro-democracy 
protests that have spread across the region 
as social movements rise up to challenge 
longstanding authoritarian rulers.
 
Yet the UK has export licencing criteria that 
should prohibit exports of military and dual-
use items, including police technology where 
there is a risk of items being used for ‘internal 
repression’ or ‘serious violation of international 
humanitarian law’. The exports, backed by a UK 
government strategy which prioritises access 
to natural resources over human rights and 
democracy, play a clear role in the repression 
recently witnessed across the region.
 
War on Want is calling for an immediate 
ban on all UK arms exports where the 
technologies risk being used in internal 
repression. This would include many regimes 
identified in this report. We are also calling for 
transparency on the details of the shadowy 
Gulf Strategy Unit and an inquiry into the role 
of UK military and police forces in providing 
training to repressive regimes.
Take Action!
Please ask your MP to write to 
the Prime Minister calling for:
• an immediate ban on exports of arms and 
repressive technologies where there is a 
risk of use for internal repression or human 
rights violations;
• detail on the personnel, objectives and 
activities of the government’s secretive Gulf 
Strategy Unit;
• an official inquiry into the role of UK military 
and police forces in providing training to 
countries where there is a risk of use for 
internal repression or human rights violations
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